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Abstract 
Polycentric governance involves multiple actors at multiple scales beyond the state. The 
potential of polycentric governance for promoting both climate mitigation and adaptation is 
well established. Yet dominant conceptualisations of polycentric governance pay scant 
attention to how power dynamics affect the structure and the outcomes of governance. We 
review emerging evidence on power within polycentric and distributed governance across the 
climate, forestry, marine, coastal, urban, and water sectors, and relate them to established 
positions on power within research on federalism, decentralisation, international relations, 
and networked governance. We develop a typology of design, pragmatic, and framing power 
that focuses on how and in whose interests power is mobilised to achieve outcomes. We 
propose that the conceptual model helps to explain power dynamics across different sectors 
and across both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Significant research challenges 
arising from the analysis include the measurement and monitoring of the outcomes of power 
asymmetries over time. 
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Highlights 
• Polycentric governance has potential, but the dominant approach fails to deal with 
the macro- and micro-level power dynamics that influence effectiveness of 
governance over time 
• Power is a fundamental aspect of polycentrism, and environmental action depends 
on an empowered set of actors 
• Power varies according to the authority to make decisions and distribute 
resources, administer, and implement rules, and interpret knowledge and set 
norms  
• A power-centred approach offers new promise for managing complex 
environmental problems 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Deliberate strategies to address environmental change are critical for achieving long-term 
environmental sustainability. In climate change policy, strategies are needed to address 
episodic and extreme events such as wildfires, droughts, floods, and heatwaves, as well as the 
long-term interactions between climatic and socio-environmental processes. For the past few 
decades a number of models to govern and manage these issues have emerged, ranging from 
traditional forms of governance (e.g. markets, communities, and governments) to hybrid 
forms of governance (e.g. public−private partnerships, concessionary mechanisms, and 
community-based interventions). New multi-level approaches seek to avoid the pitfalls and 
limitations of earlier approaches and to advance governance towards desirable norms such as 
local participation, representation, equity, legitimacy, accountability, innovation, and 
efficiency.1, 2 More recently, polycentric governance has increasingly gained traction among 
both scholars and policymakers.3  
 
Polycentrism is regarded as a model of governance that actively steers local, regional, 
national, and international actors and instigates learning from experience across multiple 
actors, levels of decision-making, and temporal scales.3, 4 In its most prevalent 
conceptualisation it is described as a non-hierarchical set of interactions between public and 
private actors operating at multiple levels (e.g. supra-national, national, sub-national) without 
a predominant central authority.5 A polycentric system is made up of many autonomous units 
that are formally independent of one another but which choose to act in ways that take 
account of others through self-organised processes of cooperation and conflict resolution.6, 7  
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Yet recent critiques have highlighted several inherent contradictions and limitations of 
polycentrism. Jordan and colleagues (2015)8 challenge the prevailing enthusiasm about 
polycentric governance in dealing with climate change, pointing out untested assumptions 
about diffusion and performance of novel governance approaches. Other research reveals the 
limitations of polycentric governance for arresting the world’s alarming deforestation rates 
through programs such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+).9 Evidence from polycentric experiments in urban planning for climate change has 
underscored the challenges in engaging with the economic and political dimensions of 
cities.10, 11. Some strands have alluded to the role that power may play in undermining the 
advantages of polycentrism over other forms of governance.12, 13 
 
At the heart of conceptualisations of polycentric governance is the focus on the emergence of 
decentralised yet networked arrangements that are connected through processes of 
cooperative learning. However, by downplaying the hierarchical or multilevel structures 
within which polycentrism is embedded, these frameworks often ignore not only different 
types of power at play but also how their distribution may affect both governance processes 
and environmental outcomes. Empirical research shows that many systems that are described 
as polycentric are critically shaped by power, both positively and negatively. For example, 
forest policy under the REDD+ program, which is generally regarded as polycentric, is 
actually embedded within established hierarchies of centralised control and state ownership 
of forest land.9 Similarly, empirical research on REDD+ in Indonesia shows that powerful 
organisations can and do shape governance structures to their own interests.14 Moreover, the 
conceptualisation of polycentrism as self-organising and non-hierarchical can be problematic 
when the state is in effect a partner in most governance schemes.2, 15 Indeed, the literature on 
decentralisation and community-based management of natural resources often exposes the 
inherent contradictions of purposefully ‘choosing’ to self-organise, and shows that the 
changing relationships of power at all levels are critical to understanding outcomes.16, 17 
Finally, some studies suggest that multiscale governance of environmental risks and 
adaptation is better conceptualised as both decentralised networks of cooperative learning 
and as expressions of power-laden social relations.18 
 
Polycentric governance is often equated with state decentralisation of authority in order to 
keep central power in check.19, 20 By limiting central power, polycentrism is purported to 
avoid the failures of state-centred governance while simultaneously empowering different 
actors and organisations to work together across and at the appropriate scale to solve critical 
environmental problems. Yet, it seems that in the pursuit of minimal active management by 
the state, polycentrism has been inadvertently rendered power-free. We believe that in order 
for polycentrism to meet its promise, its analysis and practice needs to be much more explicit 
about power in order to both reveal and address power imbalances and achieve better 
outcomes. 
 
In this article we explore these issues, focusing particularly on uncovering the role of power 
in polycentric governance. We first show how existing work on polycentric governance has 
generated significant new understanding but how it still needs to incorporate the different 
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ways of accounting for power. We then employ insights from a number of recent studies 
across the climate, forestry, marine, coastal, urban, and water sectors, and relate them to the 
findings that have emerged from much older strands of work on federalism, decentralisation, 
international relations, and networked governance. In particular, we explore the diverse 
strands of literature in order to identify different forms of power and how they may affect 
processes and outcomes of polycentric governance. We show the potential for deeper 
collaboration across a number of disciplines and multiple conceptualisations of power in 
order to produce a more comprehensive analysis of polycentric governance. In the concluding 
section, we outline the most significant research gaps identified from our analysis. 
 
2. What is polycentric governance? 
 
At first glance it is possible that any and every arrangement with multiple actors governing 
across different scales could claim to be polycentric since the degree of coordination and 
level of purposeful design might lie in the eye of the beholder. For example, the European 
Union has often been understood as both a multi-level system and a polycentric system. 
Hence, establishing some core examples of what represents ideal types of polycentric 
governance, and contrasting them with examples that clearly are not, can be difficult. 
 
Polycentricity was initially defined as the antithesis of  monocentric systems: those controlled 
by a single unitary state power (e.g. a comprehensive governmental authority).6 By contrast, 
an ideal-type polycentric system comprises multiple governing authorities at different scales 
who do not stand in hierarchical relationship to each other but function nonetheless as a 
coordinated system.3, 5 These individual authorities take account of others through processes 
of cooperation, conflict resolution, self-organisation, and mutual adjustment. Polycentric 
systems are also not to be confused with ideal-type multilevel systems, which involve a 
nested structure with a central predominant government authority whose decision-making is 
based on constituent interests (e.g. lower level authorities).21 In multilevel systems, tasks and 
decisions are allocated according to a classic federal structure or decentralised unitary 
structure, where different actors at different scales are responsible for different policy 
problems. Polycentric systems share more characteristics with networked governance 
systems, which are also characterised by a non-hierarchical yet interactive constellation of 
public and private actors at multiple levels (e.g. supra-national, national, subnational) without 
a central predominant authority.10, 22 It is also worth noting here that fragmented systems can 
also exhibit dense networks,23 but they lack self-organisation and mutual adjustment which 
are the defining features of polycentric systems (Table 1). Finally, it should be acknowledged 
that all of these categories are ideal types that are not exclusive of each other and do not 
necessary function in the ideal way in practice. 
 
Table 1. Defining characteristics of polycentric governance systems 
• many autonomous units formally independent of one another 
• multiple overlapping scales 
• units choose to act in ways that take account of others (mutual adjustment) 
• self-organised processes of cooperation and conflict resolution 
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• system-like behaviour 
 
Polanyi first introduced the concept of polycentric governance in his classic 1951 text, The 
Logic of Liberty.24 Vincent Ostrom developed the concept further in his 1961 study of 
metropolitan governance.6 Over the last decade, the significant influence of Elinor Ostrom 
and colleagues’ work on non-monocentric collective-action solutions for the provision of 
environmental goods and services has seen the polycentric model gain important traction in 
climate, resilience, and adaptation studies.7, 25-27 This strand of literature includes several 
important demonstrations of how small-scale or single resource-use systems have scaled up 
over time in response to relatively simple common use rules nested within polycentric 
systems.  
 
These studies highlight that multiple centres of decision-making can and do interact at many 
different scales. However, due to a lack of empirical data, measurement challenges, and 
problems of attribution, early work on polycentric environmental governance often took a 
normative or descriptive case-study approach to understanding polycentric systems.7, 28 The 
results remained largely descriptive (complexity as the new reality) or normative (complexity 
should be solved through bottom-up adaptation and participation across institutional 
contexts).29 
 
More recently, polycentricity in environmental governance has been conceptualised as 
ranging from weak coordination to strong polycentric order (Figure 1). Monocentricity and 
polycentricity are extremes, with many systems existing on a continuum between them.7 
Strong polycentric order is associated with a high dispersion of power. The degree of order is 
explained by concurrence of social capital, leadership, communication dynamics, negotiation 
of trade-offs, degree of formalisation, and structural patterns of networks such as scale 
bridging and coordination.30, 31  
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Figure 1: Different polycentric structures in three climate-affected regions. (a) A strong and 
highly decentralised polycentric system in coastal California (USA), where the open coast and San Francisco Bay area are 
regulated by entirely different state laws and governing bodies. The California State Government has historically played an 
equal or greater agenda-setting role in climate mitigation and adaptation than the national government, however it is 
restricted by the significant administrative powers and responsibilities held by the 74 coastal cities and counties.32 (b) The 
climate-affected Murray–Darling Basin (Australia) covers four states and a federal territory within a centralising federal 
system that is signatory to a number of international conventions.33 This is regarded as a moderate form of polycentrism 
which is becoming less polycentric as it centralises. (c) The climate-exposed North Sea coast of Germany is cooperatively 
managed by five states and the national government, which is also a member of the European Union.34 This example is 
regarded as a nascent form of polycentrism, which is still subject to issues of fragmentation. 
 
However, while this approach provides useful insights into analysis of internal social 
structures and processes of polycentric governance, the empirical literature is only beginning 
to address the strength and authority of macro-level political institutions.36 Huitema and 
colleagues28 attribute this gap to the normative and pragmatic underpinning of polycentric 
governance which judges that local self-government is best. The principle of subsidiarity—
that government functions best at the lowest feasible level—is often invoked in order to limit 
the power and responsibility of higher levels in favour of promoting strong, independent roles 
at local and regional levels.31, 37 Yet, central to the claims made for polycentricity are 
multiscale issues of power and responsibility. Indeed, multiscale power dynamics can move 
polycentric regimes between decentralised, recentralised, and fragmented states over time, 
with implications for both the structure of the system and its ability to achieve outcomes.35 
Understanding such polycentric power dynamics, however, is neither easy nor 
straightforward. As the study of polycentricity matures, there is a pressing need for a more 
analytic interrogation of not only how power is distributed across polycentric systems but 
also how power is mobilised to achieve effective systems and how it affects policy and 
management design. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that a robust and active debate has begun to emerge concerning 
the power dynamics of polycentric environmental governance, spanning the international 
climate, urban, forestry, coastal, and marine sectors. This debate is provocative because it is 
beginning to question the efficacy of polycentric governance in a field that has long tended to 
be overly exuberant about the promise of polycentrism. Emerging critiques highlight how the 
focus on soft interventions (nudging behaviour, devolution of responsibilities, fiscal 
incentives) in polycentric governance has precluded more interventionist approaches and 
failed to deal with issues such as power imbalances and social and ecological justice. 
However, we suggest that the task challenging scholars of ‘the new critical polycentrism’7-9, 
38 is to develop a framework to identify and understand power and its implications. As a first 
step, next, we revisit why polycentric governance is important for adaptation, resilience, and 
transformation. 
 
3. Why polycentric governance is important for climate mitigation and adaptation  
 
Environmental variability and change is characterised by cross-scale (spatial and temporal) 
linkages and feedbacks that generate non-linear dynamics and uncertainty. These linkages 
and feedbacks cross boundaries, cause complex social-ecological interactions, and generate 
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problems of institutional fit (Table 2). In such situations, the transformative potential of 
polycentric governance has been persuasively argued and widely advocated.3, 4 Figure 2, for 
example, shows that there has been exponential growth of scientific interest in polycentric 
governance since Elinor Ostrom spearheaded an intellectual campaign exploring the potential 
of polycentric governance to address global climate change. 
 
Table 2. Examples of dilemmas posed by the nature of climate variability and change39-
43 
 
• Temporal scale—trade-offs exist between protection of what exists now (infrastructure, 
economies, values) and longer-term adaptation. This temporal dimension leads to moral 
hazard—short-term actions and interventions that compromise, limit, or trade-off actions 
in the future (e.g. maladaptation). 
 
• Spatial scale—adaptation actions in one place may have negative impacts elsewhere—
either immediately downstream or in more remote places (e.g. teleconnections).  
 
• Transboundary issues—parts of the environment have shared jurisdiction or where natural 
resources cross boundaries—such as the global atmosphere, oceans, various water bodies, 
and migratory species (e.g. fish stocks).  
 
• Social-ecological interactions—environmental variability inevitably interacts with 
complex social dynamics, such as place, identity, and human mobility. 
 
• Non-linear dynamics—social-ecological systems exhibit non-linear or threshold 
responses to changes in climate variability.  
 
• Cross-scale feedbacks—complex interactions at different spatial or temporal scales 
generate thresholds and alternate stable states. 
 
• Institutional fit—the scale of governance must be capable of responding to the scale of 
the policy problem.  
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Figure 2: Exponential growth of scientific interest in polycentric governance. Citations to 
Vincent Ostrom’s seminal article on polycentric governance7 (black) and published articles 
on polycentric governance (grey). 
 
There are many core arguments regarding the importance of polycentric systems. First, a 
polycentric approach is capable of considering multiple environmental, social, or economic 
conditions. This flexibility allows for more democratic representation and legitimisation of 
decisions. Second, because the potential pathways to solutions of complex problems are ill-
defined, polycentric systems can provide an environment in which different actors can 
experiment with their preferred strategy of adapting to environmental variability and change. 
This capacity is also beneficial from a risk management perspective, because a ‘one-size-fits 
all’ approach may fail and this failure may well have critical adverse implications.28, 44 Third, 
because the effects of environmental variability and change are location-specific, a 
polycentric approach permits tailoring of adaptation activities to suit local-regional 
circumstances and community preferences.28, 45 Fourth, polycentric systems allow for 
specialisation and the division of tasks between central, regional, and local levels, thus 
improving the efficiency of adaptation activities by matching the governance level to the 
geographic scale of the problem.30 Fifth, many scholars believe polycentric systems to be 
flexible in their ability to configure and reconfigure alliances rapidly in order to achieve 
specific goals, which in turn makes them inherently adaptive. Sixth, polycentric systems are 
regarded as being more robust to external stresses and shocks because they can recover more 
quickly due to their diversity. Their high degree of overlap and redundancy also makes them 
less vulnerable: if one element fails, others may take over their functions (although some 
scholars have argued that redundancy may counteract nimbleness and flexibility).7, 46, 47 
Finally, in many policy-making scenarios, the multiple causal factors and symptoms 
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involved, the high levels of uncertainty about the set of solutions, and the lack of definitive 
answer as to who is responsible for the solution mean that a more monocentric approach is 
impossible, making polycentricity, in this sense, ‘a fact of life’.28, 48, 49 
 
Polycentric governance (along with multilevel, networked, and fragmented governance) has 
also raised well-documented concerns. First, if different levels of governance opt for 
conflicting policies, the result can be leakages, meaningless certification, policy incoherence, 
unnecessary duplication of efforts, counterproductive actions, and/or complete gridlock.3, 4, 28, 
50 Second, competition between levels and/or responsibilities spilling over from one level into 
another can lead to suboptimal standards for mitigation and adaptation. For example, when 
neighbouring communities handle land-use planning in risk-prone areas loosely in order to 
attract short-term-oriented investors, the environmental effects of these activities may spill 
over to neighbouring regions.51 Third, in polycentric systems, the costs in time and money of 
collective action (consultation, reaching agreement, and enforcing such agreements) are high 
due to the ‘complexity of spatial patterning, multiple functional overlays, partial polity 
formation, and variable system coupling’.5 This cost is especially high if the basic units in the 
polycentric system are very small, requiring the involvement of a larger number of 
stakeholders and the need for more information.25 Fourth, in a polycentric structure where 
responsibilities are very dispersed, new collaborative processes and organisations such as 
intergovernmental committees or specialised agencies are often set up to steer the system.52, 53 
Many of these agencies may prioritise goal achievement over democratic procedure, 
circumventing the ‘troublesome’ and ‘time-consuming’ procedures designed to ensure 
accountability and transparency at lower levels.5, 19, 28, 54 Fifth, polycentric systems are 
believed to suffer from a tendency for inertia and paralysis, especially when efforts to 
preserve the system’s own existence or permanence overtake attempts at implementation.55 
Sixth, although polycentric systems may be more robust to external stresses and shocks due 
to their diversity, emerging research shows that polycentric systems are very vulnerable to 
internal structural and procedural issues, broader economic factors, and shifts in political 
sentiment.8, 35  Furthermore, because polycentric systems seem to be a self-organising ‘fact of 
life‘, the opportunities to design and control such systems are inherently limited.26, 30  
 
However, despite progress in understanding polycentric governance, the lack of comparative 
and meta-analysis of the growing library of case studies suggests that there is much work to 
be done in resolving potential contradictions and addressing many contemporary 
assumptions. In particular, while polycentric governance involves both a configuration of 
institutions and power, the structural patterns of networked institutions in polycentric systems 
have received far more attention than the configuration of power relations across those 
structures. This omission is problematic in that it not only obscures venues for legitimacy and 
efficiency in decision-making but also reproduces unchallenged assumptions about the 
appropriate level and organisation of institutional responses to complex policy problems.46 
Structural analyses of networked institutions have unintentionally downplayed the important 
role of the nation state, the powerful private actor, the international authority, and the 
organised bureaucracy, and left a noticeable gap in the literature on the real potential for 
addressing environmental change within polycentric systems.8, 56, 57 This bias away from the 
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nation-state and other powerful actors also pervades the broader governance literature (see 
Table 3). It deserves specific attention because overlooking the mobilisation of power can 
render mitigation and adaptation within a polycentric system difficult to understand and to 
implement, and may risk reinforcing opposition and hostility towards large-scale action by 
particular actors such as nation states.51, 58 
 
Table 3. Understanding the distribution of power in contemporary governance 
studies 
Key Fields 
 
Key Concepts Key Scholars Distribution of Power  
International 
relations 
Multilateralism, 
global governance 
Keohane, Nye, 
Rosenau, Rosendal 
Upward from nation state 
Federalism and 
EU studies 
Multi-level 
governance 
Scharpf, Borzel, 
Hooghe and Marks, 
Bache and Flinders 
Downward from nation 
state 
Political science Decentralisation Crook and Manor, 
Tendler 
Downward from nation 
state 
Public policy 
and 
administration 
Network 
governance, 
fragmented 
governance 
Peters and Pierre, 
Rhodes, Bell and 
Hindmoor, Jessop 
Sideways from nation 
state 
Institutional 
economics 
Polycentric 
governance 
V. Ostrom, E. Ostrom, 
McGinnis 
Upward, downward and 
sideways from nation state 
 
Understanding adaptation in polycentric systems is easier if we understand the system not 
only as a set of institutions, agencies, and actors but also as an expression of power-laden 
social relations that affect both adaptive capacities and policy implementation.18, 57 Indeed, all 
governance involves the redistribution of power. Effective governance can thus be supported 
or resisted, depending on the normative agenda of the actors involved and whether that 
agenda is advanced by polycentrism. But what enables these different actors to wield power, 
and to prevent or encourage the competitive (and potentially maladaptive) behaviour of other 
actors? 
 
4. Locating power and authority in polycentric climate governance 
 
While there are many theories of power they all converge in highlighting that power is 
unevenly distributed and socially contested, with consequences for the creation and 
distribution of resources, opportunities and well-being.59-62 Theories diverge in their emphasis 
on individual and collective dimensions, on how power is active and observable or 
alternatively hidden and slippery, and on how the consequences of the exercise of power are 
deliberate or largely unintended.63 Many social-science theories and analyses of 
environmental governance illuminate divergent aspects of power, distinguishing between, for 
example, institutional, social, reputational, framing, political, legal, rational, relational, and 
practical aspects, as well as between power and agency.14, 64-69 These categories are not 
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mutually exclusive and may be fluid. They are often developed in a pragmatic fashion to help 
identify the aspects of power that affect, distort, and often undermine the fundamental goals 
of governance. Yet there is surprisingly little work drawing these aspects together into a 
comprehensive typology (but see Lukes, 2004). Table 4 presents such a framework: it 
identifies three comprehensive categories of power that we argue most frequently shape 
governance. Our categorisation focuses on how power varies according to the authority to 
make decisions and distribute resources (power by design), to administer and implement rules 
(pragmatic power), and to interpret knowledge and set norms (framing power). For each of 
these categories, power is a relational concept because it only emerges through interactions 
and cannot always be retrieved by looking solely at certain individual interactions or 
exchanges. Rather, it is precisely the iterative nature of these interactions that leads to the 
establishment of certain reputations, network structures, institutional arrangements, or 
principles. In this sense, power has an emergent property and actors behave in a certain way 
not only because they are powerful but also because they want to become more powerful or 
stay as powerful as they have been. Similarly, the balance of power can shift, sometimes 
quickly and dramatically, from actor to actor or organisation to organisation. In the following 
we discuss the different types of power, the causes and consequences of asymmetric power, 
and the implications of unveiling such asymmetries. Because power is not easy to observe 
and measure70 we also provide examples of typical methods of measurement.  
 
Table 4. Sources of power and authority in governance systems  
 Power by Design 
 
 
Pragmatic 
Power 
 
Framing 
Power 
 
Definition Formal authority with 
capacity to make rules, 
allocate resources, 
undertake structural 
adjustment, redesign 
markets and administrative 
structures, to tax, and 
regulate resource use and 
externalities. Includes 
legal power, political 
power, administrative 
power, and institutional 
power. 
Primarily informal 
authority with capacity to 
interpret, certify, and 
monitor rules, influence 
other actors, control 
information, to ‘govern 
by doing’ through the 
day-to-day 
implementation of 
governance mechanisms. 
Includes practical power, 
social power, 
reputational power, and 
mediating power. 
 
Often invisible 
authority with capacity 
to develop and 
codified rules and 
knowledge, to frame 
problems, construct 
issues and set norms. 
Includes discursive 
power and epistemic 
power. 
Examples 
of typical 
methods 
of 
measure-
Documentary analysis of 
relevant institutional 
arrangements, receipt and 
distribution of fiscal 
resources; employee and 
Qualitative survey of 
legal interpretation and 
bureaucratic perception;  
in-depth qualitative 
studies of practitioners, 
Discourse analysis of 
key texts; process 
tracing of paradigm 
changes; qualitative 
assessment of 
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ment budget numbers in 
organisational documents 
(qualitative and 
quantitative). 
 
combining significant 
periods of observation 
with multiple interviews. 
disciplinary expertise; 
ethnographies; 
analysis of 
qualifications and 
professional standing 
of personnel. 
 
 
4.1 Power by Design 
 
A governance regime is often defined by how its decision-making powers are distributed 
among actors at different levels. These powers can be constitutionally guaranteed (e.g. in a 
federation) and distributed jurisdictionally (e.g. devolution of decision-making powers to 
lower levels of actors). The concentration of power can be dispersed by actions such as 
establishing regional organisations for environmental management or the creation of semi-
autonomous agencies, commissions, or statutory authorities headed by appointees of the 
decision-making authority. A redistribution of power is thus the outcome of such vertical de-
concentration or delegation. 
 
In polycentric governance, high-level actors, trans-national commissions, governments, and 
multilateral organisations usually have some but limited decision-making power. Decision-
making power in this context refers not only to the ability to legislate and allocate resources, 
but also to undertake structural adjustment, redesign markets, and regulate externalities.71  
More often than not, states play a dominant role by retaining ultimate control over critical 
environmental resources such as water and forests. Extensive research has shown how states 
tend to retain power even where they apparently devolve power to lower levels of decision 
making, seek to correct and limit elite capture, and prevent the overuse and illegal use of 
resources.65, 72  
 
One of the goals of polycentric regimes is precisely to redistribute decision-making power to 
other actors and levels of government,67 yet such devolution is rare in practice.73, 74 State-
centred governance regimes routinely exercise power by design in apparently polycentric 
systems. Sovacool,38 for example, shows how a key element in successful polycentric 
approaches to energy and climate governance in Denmark, Brazil, Bangladesh and China was 
‘a central state willing to levy taxes, implement regulations, and invest in innovation----
purposefully manipulating markets to change technologies and behaviours’ (p. 3842).  
Similarly, in the case of the Australian Murray−Darling River Basin, which spans across 
several states, the national government has drawn upon its power to enforce treaties (the 
international RAMSAR convention on wetlands) in order to impose a new national law, and 
thereby override political manoeuvring by lower levels of government and other 
stakeholders.33 The fiscal dependence of the states on the national government has provided 
the national government with considerable political leverage in the Basin75 and consequently 
decision-making power has become increasingly centralised in order to enhance the Basin’s 
resilience to climate change. 
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Decision-making power within other polycentric regimes assumes different forms and reach. 
In the state of California, while decision-making power for coastal climate adaptation is the 
responsibility of the state, the national USA Coastal Zone Management Act 1972 rewards 
coastal states for developing and implementing state-level coastal regulatory programs.32 
However, federal agencies must conduct their activities (including federal development 
projects, permits, and licenses, and assistance to state and local governments) in a manner 
consistent with the state program.32 As a result, decision-making power for adaptation on the 
California coast is far more decentralised than in many other cases, with more powers 
attached to lower levels.76 Likewise, the central German government has fostered a soft 
national strategy relevant to adaptation on the German North Sea coast that has been 
developed in a consultative mode with the states (the Lander), the European Union, and other 
adjacent European countries. The Lander shares responsibility with the national government 
for decision-making and delivery in this arena but is reluctant to take over new and additional 
tasks without sufficient compensation for associated expenditures.51, 77, 78 The federal 
government provides up to 70% of the funding of capital costs for coastal protection 
infrastructure and the states contribute the remaining 30%.  
 
In effect, fiscal power, administrative power, and the power to make meaningful decisions 
continue to comprise the most visible manifestation of power in polycentric regimes. 
Indicators such as the size and hierarchical structure of organisational structures and the 
receipt and distribution of organisational resources at different levels can reveal 
administrative and fiscal power. Similarly, the distribution of decision-making power can be 
revealed through analysis of relevant institutional arrangements (Table 4).  
 
4.2 Pragmatic Power 
 
Pragmatic power refers to the exercise of functional powers by different actors through their 
influence on day-to-day decisions. In contrast to the formal and more visible nature of power 
by design, pragmatic power resides in how organisations and actors influence both the 
decision-making context and implementation process. There is substantial evidence on how 
bottom-up policy is implemented: analysis of network governance, for example, shows the 
informal yet legitimate ways in which street-level bureaucrats and non-centralised 
organisations exert power through the implementation of formal rules and norms set by 
others.79, 80 Power materialises, for example, in the interpretation of guidelines, the 
undertaking of performance evaluation, the solving of problems, and the actual 
implementation of governance mechanisms. High-level and local-level bureaucracies and 
non-state actors such as corporations and activist groups are in effect pragmatic power-
brokers.53, 65, 81  
 
Shadow and dormant networks of pragmatic power-brokers can mobilise pragmatic power 
very rapidly when necessary.82 Indeed, one key element of polycentric governance systems is 
that in order to function properly, the various governance sites and levels need to be 
connected. For instance, from the perspective of learning (the spreading of ‘best practices’ 
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from elsewhere) and mutual adjustment, local sites need to be connected with each other and 
the overall experiences of various localities needs to assessed at a higher level. In addition, 
some level of vision building at the higher-level needs to guide local experimentation. 
Networks of leaders, entrepreneurs and/or other ‘elite agents’ mobilise their unique abilities 
and qualities (e.g. charisma) and the place they occupy in networks in order to pragmatically 
determine choices.36, 83 
 
Examples of the exercise of pragmatic power within polycentric systems include the 
California Coastal Commission, mandated by the California Coastal Act. While it exercises 
high decision-making power over adaptation in the state’s coastal zone, pragmatic power 
over local planning decisions actually resides at the city and county level under the rubric of 
state environmental planning law.84 Similarly, in Brazil’s decentralised water management, 
well-connected members of river basin committees (constituted of representative users, state 
officials and others) exert de facto pragmatic power in governance of climate impacts by 
circumventing membership rules established to prevent long-term accumulation of power. 
Since membership representing any sector is limited to two years, well-connected actors are 
able to extend their influence by negotiating representation with a different sector every time 
their membership expires. While on the one hand, these actors have been able to exert 
considerable power over decisions at the expense of broader representation, on the other 
hand, they have played pivotal roles in guarding institutional memory and continuity.57, 85 In 
Indonesia, powerful organisations use their reputational power to influence decisions in the 
implementation of climate mitigation schemes such as REDD+, especially by controlling the 
exchange of information across levels, which is usually out of reach for other organisations 
because of the high transaction costs it involves.14  
 
In seeking to understand and measure pragmatic power, it is possible to study legal 
interpretation and bureaucratic perception of who has the power to influence the decision-
making context and then interpret, certify, and monitor policy priorities, adaptation 
frameworks, and compliance.65, 86, 87 This kind of information can be elicited through 
documentary or archival review (e.g. of organisational annual reports), key informant 
interviews, and surveys of participants in polycentric governance processes (e.g. to gauge 
access to formal political power, and patronage relationships involving key agencies and 
politicians) (Table 4). 
 
4.3 Framing Power  
 
Framing power is realised when individuals, institutions and organisations have the ability to 
frame problems and set norms.88 In polycentric systems this kind of power can skew 
authority and set agendas, especially if technical knowledge is uncontested and perceived as 
superior to other forms of knowledge.86, 89  Framing power-brokers produce codified rules 
over areas of knowledge (traditionally in engineering, science, economics, medicine, and 
law) and are typically evident by the existence of a large, well-funded and well-educated 
constituency with concrete discernible interests, broader political support, and the public 
good plans and initiatives that emanate from this support.90 In the environmental domain, 
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bureaucrats in the US Corps of Engineers and the US Forest Service, for example, are classic 
examples of significant actors wielding great framing power.86  
 
In California in the 1980s, state agencies that were dominated by legal experts interpreted 
separate provisions of the California Coastal Act to allow shoreline defence for existing 
structures in imminent danger from coastal erosion. As a result, seawalls became the most 
common form of coastal defence (and approximately 12% of the California coastline was 
engineered) while other states such as Oregon, Maine, and North Carolina have partial or full 
seawall prohibitions in place. While institutional and attitudinal barriers to climate adaptation 
still exist today at the local and state level,51, 91 the California Ocean Protection Council, the 
Coastal Commission, and the California State Coastal Conservancy are working to reframe 
the problem and set new norms, this time focusing on soft approaches to coastal defences.92, 
93  
 
In Brazil’s decentralised water management system, technocrats (técnicos) frequently 
mobilise ‘apolitical’ scientific information to increase regional decision-making capacity and 
policy implementation. By controlling the production and access to knowledge (e.g. climate 
forecasts) these technocrats are able to insulate decisions from river basin committee 
members and drive different agendas. For example, in dry north-eastern Brazil, técnicos have 
been able to prioritise a highly risk-averse agenda for water management that favours 
ecosystem health, whereas in the relatively water-rich south-east, hydropower companies 
dominate decision-making at the expense of other water users.89 Here, environmental 
outcomes seem to be predicated by the value systems and interests of these técnicos and their 
organisations rather than by established governance goals. 
 
Similarly, until the 1990s, the framing of water variability in the Murray−Darling Basin in 
Australia was exerted by government agencies dominated by engineering experts who were 
largely concerned with the construction of public works to manage flows and store water for 
irrigation purposes. More recently, it has become clear that the expansion of irrigation has 
long exceeded sustainable limits.94 The architects of the subsequent Draft Basin Plan (the 
ministerial council) successfully shifted the parameters of the debate from a sole focus on the 
socio-economic viability of irrigated agriculture communities to a new focus that included 
environmental sustainability in a changing climate.95  
 
In the international polycentric system for water governance,96, 97 much of the global debate 
on managing the effects of climate change takes place in fora such as the World Bank, where 
countries rather than individual farmers are represented, and where some countries are much 
more capable of steering the debate than others because they have more resources for 
representation at that forum (Belmar et al. 2016). Subsequently, ideas emanating from 
wealthier countries are adopted, and the policies of international organisations reflect the 
priorities of those countries. This dominance has consequences. For example, where the help 
of international organisations is sought (e.g. in the form of a loan for the development of 
critical infrastructure), specific policies must be accepted as a condition for financial aid and 
re-applied in situations which are inappropriate.98 
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Strong framing power can emerge from a persuasive base of disciplinary expertise in a highly 
regarded profession, including at the leadership level.86 Framing power can be elicited 
through records of organisational workforce (e.g. annual reports) which usually indicate not 
only the total number of personnel but also the professional base of that personnel in terms of 
qualifications and disciplinary mix. The distribution of framing power can also be analysed in 
terms of the existence of concrete groups (e.g. non-profit organisations, intergovernmental 
groups) and their involvement in setting the agenda for public-good plans and initiatives. This 
distribution can be understood through documentary review (e.g. discourse analysis of key 
texts, process tracing of paradigm changes), qualitative assessment of disciplinary expertise, 
ethnographies and participant observation and quantitative analysis of number of personnel 
with advanced or professional qualifications (Table 4). 
 
4.4 Causes and consequences of asymmetric power distribution in polycentric climate 
governance 
 
The different types of power identified above are not static, nor are they evenly distributed. 
Indeed, scholars of power have long questioned ideals about stable and balanced power, 
favoring more fluid and asymmetric understanding. Empirical research show that 
asymmetries in the distribution of power emanate from different sources, including disparities 
in wealth, education, rights, representation, information access and control, patronage, and 
military might. These asymmetries are further obscured by recent trends in the 
decentralisation, technocratisation, marketisation and privatisation of environmental 
governance, which have increased the reach of private and NGO power, but without the 
traditional accountability and legitimacy checks of the democratic state.99, 100 And, despite the 
distributed power ideal, polycentric governance of climate, rather than being immune to these 
asymmetries, is as vulnerable to them as other forms of governance. For example, recent 
research has shown how the asymmetric qualities of power, when left unchecked, can affect 
the outcomes of polycentric governance. Unchecked power imbalances in polycentric 
governance of REDD+ and the Global Environment Facility’s Least Developed Countries 
Fund have skewed stakeholder representation and risk, reinforcing pre-existing elites while 
further marginalising the vulnerable.14, 38 Unaccountable private and NGO influence, 
combined with general retreat of state responsibility for public goods and services, can have 
serious implications for both climate mitigation and adaption, both in terms of capacities and 
policy implementation.35, 101  
 
4.5 Methods for unveiling the dimensions of power 
 
We have argued above that while polycentric climate governance clearly involves both a 
configuration of institutions and power, the structural patterns of networked institutions in 
polycentric systems have received far more attention than the configuration of asymmetric 
power relations across those structures. This emphasis on network structure has led to an 
over- concentration on power by design. Yet, understanding adaptation and mitigation in 
polycentric systems is easier if we understand the system not only as a decentralised networks 
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of cooperative learning across institutions, agencies, and actors, but also as an expression of 
power-laden social relations.18 This understanding illuminates other less visible forms of 
power such as pragmatic power and framing power. We suggest here that these less visible 
forms may be the more dominant modes through which collective goals in polycentric 
systems are sought and sometimes achieved. Unveiling such power dynamics is not easy.70 
Power dynamics will always vary on a case-by-case basis and may involve tangible (time, 
money, and financial) and intangible (trust, legitimacy) transaction costs. However, if we 
want to improve the design and outcomes of polycentric governance in any meaningful way, 
we need to identify and understand the (negative and positive) roles power can play. Here, we 
have provided examples of typical methods of observation and measurement that are 
applicable across cases. 
 
Attention to these different types of power offers new promise for governing complex 
environmental problems, in a number of ways. First, by revealing the different types of 
power, governance actors can assess power dynamics and how asymmetries can increase the 
risks for corruption and other abuses of power (such as closed-door deals, conflicts of 
interest, illegal finance, and patchy law enforcement). Here, knowledge can empower actors 
and help them to influence others.100 Such actions can include exposing asymmetric power 
dynamics through new information, advocating changes to societal norms or government and 
industry policies or rules, mobilising new interest groups and coalitions, and generating other 
forms of countervailing power.48, 102, 103 For example, in the Brazilian water management 
example, técnicos have been able to use climate information as leverage to curb both 
economic and political power within river basin committees.90 Fung104 also describes, for 
example, the generation of a ‘civic immune system’ whereby an ecology of transparency, 
accountability, and monitoring mechanisms and associations can monitor and disclose 
information to enhance democracy and seek to limit major abuses of power. These 
mechanisms and associations include public, private, and non-profit mechanisms and 
associations which seek to audit, verify, and certify, such as traditional government audit 
offices and commissions, private certifiers, and non-profit organisations (e.g. Transparency 
International, the Sunlight Foundation in the US, and GetUp in Australia). These mechanisms 
and associations can and do work together to constitute new forms of countervailing power, 
with the potential to correct or at least keep in check the negative consequences of power 
asymmetry and abuse in polycentric climate governance.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and future contributions of a power-centered framework 
 
Models and theories of polycentric governance are making substantial headway on issues of 
innovation, trust, scale, and knowledge.8, 105-108 Here we emphasise that all of these issues are 
illuminated by inclusion of power dynamics and that such inclusion increases the explanatory 
power of these models. We argue that while dominant conceptualisations of polycentric 
governance provide useful insights into the potential for climate mitigation and adaptation, 
present models downplay the powerful roles of higher levels including those of the nation 
state, as well as the more diffuse exercise of power at lower levels of governance. We are not 
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implying that the state always plays the most powerful hand or that there is an underlying 
model for how power should be most effectively structured. Indeed, decades of research on 
federalism, decentralisation, and international relations have shown that even in the presence 
of strong systems, horizontal and vertical cooperation is difficult.76, 109, 110 Rather, we argue 
that it is critical to understand how different actors mobilise power and authority in 
polycentric systems in order to bring about transformational change.  
 
Many studies of polycentrism focus on visible examples of decentralisation and 
experimentation. These are often presented as complex yet politically benign structures; for 
example, network structures that rely on soft interventions such as information sharing, 
devolution of responsibilities, and fiscal incentives. Yet, despite their complexity and benign 
appearance, polycentric governance systems continue to emerge spontaneously in response to 
environmental dilemmas and are often exciting in terms of how they invoke different sources 
of power to achieve or avoid collective goals. In our categorisation, we suggest that 
pragmatic power and framing power may be the dominant modes through which collective 
goals in polycentric systems are sought and sometimes achieved.  
 
We have highlighted how three specific elements of power—power by design, pragmatic 
power, and framing power—imbue different levels of actors and arrangements with the 
authority to realise collective goals in polycentric governance systems. Further research is 
needed to explore many of the issues raised in this review. First, it is important to be clear 
and specific on what makes polycentric governance distinctive, and to identify how 
embedded and prevalent it is in all governance structures. Second, it is necessary to track how 
power dynamics within polycentric governance systems change over time. A significant 
research task is the development of methods capable of monitoring different elements of 
power. Many policy analyses focus on short time frames of four to six years.80 However, we 
suggest that a longer time frame is more suitable for an analysis of the capillary nature of 
power as it shifts over time.35, 59, 69 A third analytical task suggested by our review is the 
clarification of causality in study design: is power an inevitable outcome of governance 
structures or independent of such structures?111 Settling such methodological questions would 
facilitate the building of a significant evidence base on the presence, effectiveness, and 
distributional impacts of polycentric governance. There is also the more normative question 
of how power should be most effectively structured in particular polycentric systems; for 
instance, should it be evenly distributed, or should the weakest actors have veto power? 
These are important questions for further research.  
 
At the heart of this scientific debate is the issue of whether interactions between different 
actors in polycentric systems actually improves the prospects of dealing with the dilemmas of 
climate change. The promise is that polycentric systems bridge the divide between 
hierarchical structures and the lack of agency involved in both adaptation and mitigation 
efforts. By promoting detailed analysis of power, we argue that the failures of polycentric 
systems to deliver on their promise can be at least partially explained, and perhaps that 
recognising such power can aid in better governance to avoid the constraints and pitfalls of 
the capture of structure by certain interests. Ultimately, future development, implementation, 
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and practice would be enhanced by recognising how power is mobilised to achieve goals, and 
in whose interest it is exercised. 
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